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When the mind wanders away from the here-and-now toward imaginary events, it typically
does so from one of two visual vantage points—a first-person perspective (i.e., the world
is seen as it is in everyday life) or a third-person perspective (i.e., the world is seen from
the viewpoint of an outside observer). While extant evidence has detailed consequences
that ensue from the utilization of these distinct points of view, less is known about their
more basic properties. Here, we investigated the prevalence, demographics and qualities
associated with the visual perspective that people spontaneously adopt when the mind
wanders. The results from a cross-cultural survey (N = 400) revealed that almost half of
the participants (46%) typically utilize a third-person perspective when mind wandering.
Further, culture and gender were shown to impact the distribution of first- and third-person
imagers. Specifically, a first-person perspective was more common among participants
from Western nations and females, while participants from Eastern cultures resonated
more strongly with a third-person perspective. Moreover, these factors were also shown
to impact qualities (e.g., temporal locus, vividness) of mental imagery. Taken together, the
current findings elucidate the prevalence of first- and third-person visual perspectives and
detail individual differences that influence the qualia of mind wandering.
Keywords: mental imagery, visual perspective, vantage point, mind wandering, cross cultural, third person
INTRODUCTION
Despite being physically grounded in the present, people spend
up to half of their waking lives mentally detached from the here-
and-now (Giambra, 1995; Smallwood et al., 2003, 2004; Schooler
et al., 2005; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Kane et al., 2007;
Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). In particular, it is when plagued
by foul moods (Smallwood et al., 2009) or performing repetitive
or mundane activities (Fisher, 1987; Singer, 1966) that the mind
is most likely to wander. This transcendence of time and space
reorients attention inward, to a world of vibrant mental images
that are often unrelated to the task at hand.
Given the mind’s propensity to escape lackluster or trouble-
some realities, one cannot help but speculate about the imagina-
tive characters and properties these fantasy destinations contain.
Perhaps disappointingly, it is rarely lions, witches and magic
wardrobes, but rather house cats, horrible bosses and overstuffed
closets that are typically encountered when meandering through
the mental world. In short, the contents of the wandering mind
most commonly reflect the typical characteristics of day-to-day
life (Addis et al., 2007; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Schacter et al.,
2007; Szpunar, 2010). This overlap between real and imaginary
events reveals the building blocks used to construct the mental
world. Specifically, it is only by recycling episodic and seman-
tic knowledge that it is possible to simulate future realities at all
(Szpunar, 2010).
While at first glance mental images that emphasize the mun-
dane aspects of life may seem futile, they are actually an extremely
prudent use of the mind’s power of simulation—facilitating
matchless preparation for things to come. As is evidenced by the
temporal locus of mental journeys, people do not tune out sim-
ply to watch reruns of the past, but more often to problem solve
in the present and gain sneak previews of the future (Binder et al.,
1999; Klinger, 1999;Mason et al., 2009; Killingsworth andGilbert,
2010). Consequently, the time spent mind wandering can often
provide functional advantages. For example, mentally simulating
a route home from work on a Friday afternoon or the flavor of a
bacon-infused cocktail can help one avoid traffic jams or circum-
vent a potentially disastrous beverage choice. To this end, mind
wandering comprises a core component of mental functioning,
facilitating decision making and action planning (Tulving, 2002;
Schacter et al., 2007).
It is precisely because thinking serves as a functional pre-
cursor of doing (James, 1890; Fiske, 1992) that the world tends
to be imagined as it is experienced in everyday life, preserving
its structural properties and activating much the same neural
architecture that supports genuine experience (Jeannerod, 2001;
Fadiga and Craighero, 2004; Ganis et al., 2004; Kosslyn et al.,
2006). However, one notable inconsistency between the real and
the imagined persists. During mental simulations, two visual per-
spectives are possible: a first-person (actor) perspective and a
third-person (observer) perspective. With a first-person visual
experience, the world is imagined just as it is encountered in
everyday life, viewing only what would actually lie within one’s
own visual field. Alternatively a third-person visual perspective
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mimics the viewpoint of an outsider1, allowing people to visualize
themselves in their mind’s eye and observe their own behaviors
(Nigro and Neisser, 1983; Sutin and Robins, 2008). So while real
life only occasionally affords the opportunity to view oneself from
a third-person perspective (e.g., photographs, mirrors), the imag-
ination can readily recruit this point of view (Nigro and Neisser,
1983; Sutin and Robins, 2008; Rice and Rubin, 2011).
Of particular relevance to the manner in which imagination
can shape behavior, a growing body of evidence suggests that
multiple vantage points are not simply an innocuous aspect of
conscious experience, but rather exert influence on the conse-
quences of mental simulation (White and Hardy, 1995; Janzen
et al., 2001; Libby et al., 2007; Macrae et al., 2013). These observed
differences have often been attributed to the type of information
that is most readily accessed from a given perspective (Libby and
Eibach, 2011). More specifically, first-person perspective has been
shown to emphasize experiential aspects of a simulation whereas
a third-person perspective seems to incorporate more contextual
information. By providing access to unique types of information,
visual perspective can alter the emotional intensity of an event
(Berntsen and Rubin, 2006; Williams and Moulds, 2008) and
influence cognitive processing styles (Libby and Eibach, 2011).
While perspective can be overtly manipulated, influencing
everything from the way an event is construed (Libby and Eibach,
2011) to the extent that an imaginary experience will influence
subsequent judgments (e.g., person perception; Macrae et al.,
2013) and behaviors (e.g., voting; Libby et al., 2007), the wan-
dering mind will spontaneously adopt one of the two visual
perspectives when playing stimulus independent thoughts in the
theater of consciousness. As such, might the perspective naturally
utilized for simulation also be indicative of the types of infor-
mation emphasized when the mind wanders? Despite notable
influences on cognition and behavior when perspective is manip-
ulated in a laboratory, little is known about the characteristic
properties of the mental worlds that people spontaneously con-
struct. Instead, the majority of research on perspective taking has
utilized memory-probe paradigms (Sutin and Robins, 2008). As a
result, it is uncertain just how common a third-person perspective
of self is in the mental world and whether or not there are sys-
tematic patterns with respect to the visual perspective individuals
most frequently adopt when their minds wander. Put simply, it is
still unclear which visual perspective is most prevalently adopted
and by whom.
When Nigro and Neisser (1983) originally identified that
first- and third-person perspectives were utilized in recall, they
reported a greater overall occurrence of field (i.e., first-person)
than observer (i.e., third-person)memories.While the actual pro-
portion of memories characterized by a third compared to first-
person visual perspective may be greater than initially thought
(Rice and Rubin, 2011), there seems to be biases toward a
given perspective (e.g., a greater amount of memories character-
ized by either first or third point of view) between participants
1An important conceptual distinction concerns “who” precisely is doing the
observing and “who” is the observed when mentally simulating events from
a third-person perspective. Here we operationalized third person simulations
to mean that the self was both the observer and observed.
(Nigro and Neisser, 1983). As a result of this finding, Nigro and
Neisser (1983) speculated that a commonly utilized point of view
might be indicative of different cognitive processing styles across
participants (Nigro and Neisser, 1983).
Evidence corroborating the conjecture that individual differ-
ences may influence point of view has suggested that conceptual-
izations of the self and its relation to the environment are linked
to the adoption of a spatial-visual perspective (Cohen et al., 2007;
Libby and Eibach, 2011). Cohen et al. (2007) have demonstrated
that Asian-Americans and Euro-Americans show systematic dif-
ferences in point of view depending upon the context of a recalled
memory. Specifically, when recalling memories that focus on the
self, Asian-Americans are more likely to adopt the perspective of
an outside observer than are Euro-Americans. These patterns of
adopted visual perspective are believed to be reflective of distinct
socio-cultural processing styles. Indeed, a cultural divide in con-
ceptualizations of self such that Easterners are said to be more
collectivistic, whereas Westerners tend to be more individualistic,
(for reviews, see Triandis, 1989; Oyserman et al., 2002) provides
a cogent explanation for the patterns observed in perspectives
utilized in personal memories. As such, it seems reasonable to
suspect that deeply engrained cognitive processes will be mani-
fest globally during mind wandering, leading people to resonate
most strongly with a particular viewpoint.
Following this line of reasoning, we suspect that when asked
to characterize the visual perspective most frequently adopted
during mind wandering: (i) both first- and third-person points
of view will be commonly identified as dominant modes of
simulation (across individuals); and (ii) vantage point prefer-
ences are likely to vary as a function of factors associated with
population-level differences in processing style (e.g., culture).
Specific predictions, based on previous work by Cohen et al.
(2007) and an in-depth body of knowledge explicating cultural
differences in processing style (i.e., holistic vs. analytic, see Barrett
et al., 1998; Seidlitz and Diener, 1998; Nisbett and Masuda, 2003;
Piefke et al., 2005) and conceptualizations of self (i.e., individual-
istic vs. collectivistic), focus on the influence of culture on visual
perspective. Due to the self-centric nature of mind wandering
(Baird et al., 2011), we anticipate cultural differences to man-
ifest themselves in dominant imagery perspectives. Specifically,
we suspect participants from Eastern societies will resonate more
strongly with a third-person perspective than participants from
Western Societies (i.e., similar to the patterns observed by Cohen
et al., 2007). While the current investigation also explored demo-
graphic variables such as age and gender that have been shown to
influence visual perspective during memory retrieval (Huebner
and Fredrickson, 1999) and day dreaming (Mar et al., 2012) we
remained agnostic in regards to what effect these variables might
have on the visual perspective participants use to characterize
their mind wandering.
It is important to note the current paper is exploratory and
descriptive in nature, and was initially motivated to explore the
extent to which participants most commonly resonated with a
first-or third-person perspective outside of a laboratory setting.
While previous work has identified the ability and tendency for
people to utilize both first- and third-person perspectives (even
within a single memory, Rice and Rubin, 2009) the methods
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we employed isolated what individuals’ believe to be their most
common or dominant visual perspective. The research was
inspired by observations in the laboratory when instructing
participants to take either a first- or third-person perspective.
Namely, a number of individuals reported struggling to maintain
a visual perspective that was “unfamiliar to them” or counter to
what they “normally do.” While the ability for participants to
tap into and accurately assess the nature of their visual imagery
could be questioned, it seems more likely that these reports are
indicative of a phenomenon that has been largely overlooked in
the perspective taking literature since it was initially suggested
by Nigro and Neisser (1983)—people may have a natural or
dominant visual perspective.
The current study recruited an international sample to
investigate the prevalence of first- and third-person natural
imagery perspectives as well as the influence of demographic vari-
ables (culture, gender, age) on the view from the mind’s eye.
Additionally, we considered the effects that these factors may have
on other core properties (e.g., vividness, temporal locus, valence,
sensory modality) of the mental events that occur when the mind
wanders as these variables are commonly assessed when consid-
ering mind wandering, day dreaming and other related topics.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
ETHICS STATEMENT
The study was reviewed and approved by the School of
Psychology, University of Aberdeen Ethics Committee. All par-
ticipants were informed about the nature of the study prior to
agreeing to participate and were able to withdraw from the study
at any point.
PARTICIPANTS
Four hundred participants (197 females) aged 16–63 years 2
(M = 29.4 years, SD = 10.0 years) were recruited and tested
online using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 3 (www.mturk.com).
Two hundred of the participants tested were residing in Eastern
Asian Countries (e.g., India, South Korea) while the remain-
ing two hundred were residing in Western Countries (e.g.,
U.S., U.K.)4. Mechanical Turk’s unique “worker id” numbers were
recorded for each participant, thus allowing multiple responses
from the same individual to be excluded from data analysis.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
A short questionnaire was designed to investigate fundamental
characteristics of spontaneous mind wandering. After report-
ing on basic demographic information (age, sex, country of
residence), participants were asked to identify the visual per-
spective (i.e., first or third) they most commonly adopt when
2Distribution of age groups in the current sample: 16–17 = 0.5%, 18–35 =
79.75%, 36–65 = 16.25% and 66–73 = 3.5%.
3See Duran et al. (2011) concerning validity of data collection via Mechanical
Turk.
4All participants classified as “Eastern” either reported residing in one of the
following countries (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, South Korea, Philippines) or in “Asia” generally. All participants
classified as “Western” reported residing in one of the following countries
(Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, UK, USA).
their mind wanders or they imagine an event by selecting one
of the following options: 1. “I cannot see myself (I imagine
the scene through my own eyes)” or 2. “I can see myself (I
imagine the scene as if I were an outside observer).” Next partic-
ipants reported, on a 10-point scale, the typical vividness (1 =
not very vivid, 10 = very vivid), valence (1 = always negative,
10 = always positive), and temporal direction (1 = always past,
10 = always future) of their mental meanderings. Finally, par-
ticipants were asked to identify the primary sensory modality
(e.g., vision, audition) experienced during instances of mental
imagery.
RESULTS
FREQUENCY OF PERSPECTIVE
The primary focus of the present study was to identify the fre-
quency with which first- and third-person visual perspectives
are spontaneously adopted during periods of mind wandering
and mental imagery. To this end, 53% of participants reported
most commonly utilizing a first-person visual perspective while
the remaining 47% reported adopting a third-person vantage
point when imagining events 5. A chi-square test of goodness-
of-fit (expected values = 50%) confirmed that these proportions
were uniformly distributed, χ2(1,N = 400) = 1.44, p = 0.23,
such that, overall, both visual perspectives were equally preva-
lent. Subsequent analyses sought to further explore this finding
by identifying if the distribution of first and third visual perspec-
tives differed as a function of demographic variables such as age,
gender and culture.
CULTURE
A chi-square test of independence revealed a relationship between
culture (i.e., West vs. East) and visual perspective, χ2(1,N =
400) = 9.03, p = 0.003. Specifically, in Western cultures a first-
person perspective was most prevalent (60.5%), while in Eastern
cultures this pattern was reversed such that a third-person per-
spective was most frequently reported (59.5%), as shown in
Figure 1. Subsequent chi-square tests of goodness-of-fit con-
ducted separately for each culture confirmed a preference for first-
person imagery among those from Western cultures, χ2(1,N =
200) = 8.82, p = 0.003, and third-person imagery within those
from Eastern cultures, χ2(1,N = 200) = 7.22, p = 0.007.
5In response to a reviewer’s concern regarding the validity of this critical mea-
sure (i.e., whether participants are able to reliably identify, via introspection,
the visual perspective they most commonly adopt) we surveyed 12 additional
participants (6 females, mean age = 19.4 years, all residing in a Western
nation). Specifically, we asked them to engage in a series of guided mental
imagery tasks involving performing simple everyday actions (e.g., picking up
an object) and to report the perspective they adopted on each occasion. We
also asked them to indicate the perspective they most commonly adopt using
the same question as in themain study (task order was counterbalanced across
participants). Consistent with the main findings, 6 participants reported most
commonly using a first-person perspective, and 6 a third-person perspective.
Importantly, those who reported most commonly adopting a first-person per-
spective also spontaneously adopted this perspective more frequently during
guided imagery than those who reported naturally adopting a third-person
perspective, t(9. 51) = 2.59, p = 0.03, d = 1.49. This suggests some degree
of consistency between the visual perspective people report adopting when
asked to reflect on their mental experiences, and that employed when actually
engaging in imagery.
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FIGURE 1 | Percentage of reported visual perspective in Western (left
panel) and Eastern (right panel) societies.
FIGURE 2 | Percentage of reported visual perspective among male (left
panel) and female (right panel) participants.
GENDER
A chi-square test of independence revealed a relationship between
gender and visual perspective, χ2(1,N = 400) = 5.39, p = 0.02.
Female participants were more likely to report adopting a
first-person perspective (59.9%) than their male counterparts
(47.3%), as shown in Figure 2. Furthermore, separate chi-square
tests of goodness-of-fit revealed that while females showed a pref-
erence (greater than chance) for first-person over third-person
imagery, χ2(1,N = 197) = 6.22, p = 0.01, males showed no
such pattern, χ2(1,N = 203) = 0.60, p = 0.44.
AGE
A point-biserial correlation revealed no relationship between par-
ticipant age and the visual perspective they reported adopting
during mental imagery, rpb(400) = 0.008, p = 0.88.
CHARACTERISTICS OF IMAGERY
Separate 2 (Culture: West or East) × 2 (Gender: Male or Female)
between-participants ANOVAs were conducted on participants’
ratings of the typical vividness, valence and temporal direction of
their imaginary experiences.
Vividness
A main effect of Culture, F(1, 396) = 5.33, p = 0.02, η2p =
0.01, was revealed such that participants from Eastern soci-
eties reported less vivid mental imagery (M = 5.58, SD = 2.50)
than participants fromWestern societies (M = 6.17, SD = 2.09).
Furthermore, a main effect of Gender, F(1, 396) = 5.38, p = 0.02,
η2p = 0.01, was also revealed whereby males reported less vivid
mental imagery (M = 5.58, SD = 2.30) than females (M = 6.18,
SD = 2.30). No interaction effect was found.
Valence
Participants’ reports of the valence of their mental images did
not vary as a function of Culture or Gender, nor was there any
interaction between these factors.
Temporal direction
A main effect of culture on the temporal direction of reported
mental imagery was revealed, F(1, 396) = 12.38, p < 0.001, η2p =
0.03, whereby participants from Eastern cultures reported
a greater tendency toward future-oriented mental imagery
(M = 5.85, SD = 2.57) than participants from Western cultures
(M = 5.04, SD = 2.24). No other main effects or interaction
effects were found for ratings of temporal direction.
Sensory modality
Finally, irrespective of culture and gender, vision and audition
were reported as the most dominant sensory modalities of men-
tal imagery. In total, 82% (328) of participants reported vision
as the primary sensory component of their mental imagery.
Interestingly, 7.8% (31) reported their primary sensory modal-
ity to be audition, 3.8% (15) tactile, 3.3% (13) kinesthetic, 1.8%
(7) olfaction, and 1.5% (6) gustatory.
DISCUSSION
The current study explored whether the core properties of the
mental imagery that is often associated with mind wandering
vary as a function of participants’ demographic profile. Most
notably, this investigation revealed that approximately half (46%)
of participants reported most commonly adopting a third-person
visual perspective when their minds wandered or they imagined
an event. Interestingly, further analysis revealed that visual per-
spective differed as a function of demographic variables such
that females and residents from Western nations reported most
frequently adopting a first-person point of view, whereas a third-
person perspective was more common among participants from
Eastern countries.
The overall dominance of first-person visual perspective in
Western cultures is consistent with findings from memory-probe
experiments (Nigro and Neisser, 1983) and other investigations
of spontaneously adopted visual perspective during guided men-
tal imagery (Robinson and Swanson, 1993). To our knowledge,
the prevalence of first- and third-person visual perspectives has
not been studied exclusively in Eastern Societies, although Asian-
Americans have been shown to utilize a third-person perspec-
tive during memory retrieval more readily than Euro-Americans
(Cohen et al., 2007). The current findings confirm and extend
previous work, showing that patterns of visual perspective dif-
fer across cultures and emphasize the prevalence of third-person
simulations in everyday life (Rice and Rubin, 2011).
Focusing specifically on gender, it should be noted that a few
reports have shown females to utilize a third-person perspec-
tive more than males (Huebner and Fredrickson, 1999; Rice and
Rubin, 2009). A number of factors may be responsible for the
differences between these findings and the ones presented in the
current paper. Namely, previous experiments have focused on
memory and dictated specific content, which is likely to influ-
ence the perspective adopted during simulation (Rice and Rubin,
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2009). For example, Rice and Rubin (2009) found females to
have more dominant third-person experiences than males when
recalling memories prior to the first grade. Additionally, asked
to recall memories that were likely to makes individuals feel
objectified, females were more likely than males to utilize a third-
person as opposed to a first-person perspective (Huebner and
Fredrickson, 1999). It is precisely because manipulations within
laboratory studies can so readily shape the visual perspective a
person adopts that we chose to address the prevalence of first-
and third-person viewpoints with a survey approach. However,
establishing whether dissimilarities in methods can account for
differences in findings (e.g., with respect to gender) needs to be
addressed in future research.
Beyond vantage point, the present work identified other
components of mental imagery that were also influenced by
demographic variables. Specifically, culture and gender displayed
systematic relationships with vividness ratings such that males
and Easterners reported less vivid imagery than females and
Westerners. Temporal locus (i.e., past vs. future) was also influ-
enced by geographical location as individuals from Eastern soci-
eties reported a higher prevalence of future-oriented imagery than
their Western counterparts. Characteristics such as valence and
primary sensory modality, on the other hand, were unaffected by
demographic variables.
Different imagery experiences across cultures and genders lead
one to consider what factors might be shaping the characteristics
of mind wandering. Previous work has postulated that differences
in cognitive processing styles may underlie the tendency to adopt
a given perspective during memory retrieval (Nigro and Neisser,
1983; Cohen et al., 2007). In other words, it might be the case
that relatively stable differences in the way one conceptualizes the
world also shape the visual perspective used to mentally simulate
events. Indeed, research has indicated that an interaction between
conceptualizations of self (i.e., independent vs. interdependent)
and imagery content are associated with systematic shifts in
perspectives between Asian-Americans and European-Americans
during memory retrieval and online experiences (Cohen et al.,
2007).
What is more, research on visual perspective has empha-
sized the role of first-person perspective in emotional/experiential
simulations. While not tested here, it is possible that group
level differences in the emotional intensity of mind wander-
ing content (whether positive or negative) may influence natu-
ral imagery perspective and characteristics of imagery such as
vividness. Indeed, previous research has identified that females
(Davis, 1999) and Westerners (Wang, 2001) report more detailed
and emotionally charged childhood memories. As emotion-
ally intense memories are highly correlated with vividness
(Talarico et al., 2004), these differences in episodic content may
not only influence prospective future thought, but the assess-
ments of general mind wandering characteristics. An impor-
tant area for future research will be to investigate the extent
to which these factors are associated with natural imagery
perspective.
Since the current results speak to unconstrained mind
wandering (i.e., mental content was not dictated, prompted, or
probed), it is possible that the culture and gender differences seen
here are a result of reliable differences in what is most commonly
simulated (i.e., imagery content), how it is contextualized (i.e.,
cognitive processing style) or a combination of the two. Future
research could investigate typical content of mind wandering as it
relates to demographic variables such as gender and culture. If, for
instance, residents of Eastern societies are more likely to simulate
social situations (i.e., emphasizing relationship with group) or
females are more likely to imagine intensely emotional scenarios
(i.e., emphasizing internal experience), then these differences may
underlie the unique recruitment of first vs. third-person visual
perspectives.
Elsewhere, it has been shown that specific types of infor-
mation seem to be most commonly associated with each point
of view. Namely, a first-person perspective has been shown to
provide greater access to the internal/emotional components
(experiential factors) of a mental event whereas a third-person
perspective is more likely to emphasize the contextual infor-
mation about an imaginary experience (see Libby and Eibach,
2011). While speculative, it may be the case that first- and
third-person perspectives bring different aspects of an experi-
ence into focus which, in turn, interacts with societal norms
across cultures and genders (i.e., to express vs. suppress emo-
tion, to understand self in relation to the group vs. an indi-
vidual). As a result, certain types of simulations may recruit
specific points of view. Further explorations could look at the
relationship between natural imagery perspective and how indi-
viduals vary in terms of emotional expressivity or indepen-
dence/interdependence as well as other individual difference
measures.
Notwithstanding the necessity of future research to determine
the additional factors that impact population level patterns in
vantage point preference, a growing body of evidence testifies
to the real world consequences that can transpire as a result of
adopting a specific visual perspective. For example, the way that
imaginary experiences shape core aspects of how we perceive oth-
ers (Macrae et al., 2013), the likelihood of making a trip to the
polls (Libby et al., 2007), assessments of self-change over time
(Libby and Eibach, 2002) and the intensity of a traumaticmemory
(Williams and Moulds, 2008) can all be matters of visual per-
spective. If it is assumed that disparate simulation modes result
in unique behavioral outcomes, and there is an established divi-
sion between dominant imagery perspectives, an important area
for future research will be to establish if there are fundamen-
tal differences in the behaviors of natural first- and third-person
imagers.
Importantly, however, it is worth noting that a natural or
preferred imagery perspective (as identified here) does not sug-
gest that an individual would visualize every simulation through
the lens of a single perspective, nor that they would be unable
or unlikely to alternate between vantage points (Robinson and
Swanson, 1993). Rather, we emphasize that people differentially
resonate with each of the two possible visual perspectives, an idea
that has been echoed in investigations of motor imagery (see Hall,
1997; Calmels et al., 2006; Holmes, 2007) and memory (Nigro
and Neisser, 1983). As was previously noted, it is possible that the
current results reflect a specific mental imagery simulation (i.e.,
“a simulation of simulations”) that was run and utilized to assess
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their personal imagery experiences. As such, the availability and
type of content simulated may be shaping participants’ responses
to the question of a dominant imagery perspective. While we are
confident that the present approach accurately reflects the way
participants engage in the mental world3, it is of course, feasible
that additional, unknown factors contributed to the current find-
ings. For instance, if participants were in fact unable to accurately
report about a dominant visual perspective, then a potentially
interesting question would be to investigate the social and cultural
factors that ultimately influenced their decisions in regards to
what perspective they think is dominant. To address other poten-
tial explanations, it is important that future research attempt to
substantiate the claims made here with alternative methods of
assessing natural imagery perspective.
Anecdotally, participants have been known to report difficul-
ties maintaining a visual perspective incongruent to the one they
typically adopt—an effect that seems to interact with the nature of
the imagined event. Thus, when instructing a specific visual per-
spective, novelty, the possible increase of cognitive load required
to maintain an unfamiliar perspective, or specific demands of
a given imaginary event (e.g., simulating an internal sensation
such as pain) may also influence outcomes. In short, participants
who are requested to use an atypical visual perspective may show
different results than those asked to adopt a perspective consis-
tent with their preferred point of view for the given situation.
While previous evidence seems to support this conjecture, further
investigations will be vital in order to understand the nuanced
interactions between natural imagery mode and instructed per-
spective (Williams and Moulds, 2008; Callow and Roberts, 2010).
As such, it might also important for future work to consider each
individual’s common mode of simulation when exploring the
outcomes of both spontaneous and guided mental imagery.
One final cautionary consideration brought to light by the
current study is the semantic overlap that exists in the literature
on perspective taking. While the descriptions of third-person per-
spective in our study detailed self as both actor and observer, a
majority of the literature about third-person perspective hinges
upon a self-other distinction where self is the observer and an
“other” is the observed (e.g., Vogeley and Fink, 2003; Jackson
et al., 2006; Ames et al., 2008). Studies operating with these
definitions assess key aspects of social cognition (e.g., empathy,
mentalizing) and highlight interesting differences between self
and other imagery, however they are potentially tangential to the
everyday self-simulations that serve to tailor individual behav-
ior. To this end, recent research has focused on instructing a
third-person-self simulation mode where self is both the observer
and the observed (Libby and Eibach, 2011; Macrae et al., 2013).
Given the potential for confusion, it seems particularly relevant
for future research to emphasize who the third-person is during
a simulation1. As such, further explorations will be vital to estab-
lish the similarities and differences between third-person-other
and third-person-self visuo-spatial tasks.
Taken together, the current findings highlight that a third-
person perspective is not constrained to considerations of an
“other” person as it is often conceptualized in the literature, nor
is it simply an unconventional device that can be pulled out of the
cognitive toolbox to alter thinking and behavior. Rather, a third-
person perspective that focuses on self appears to be a stable and
commonmode ofmental simulation. It seems that the proportion
of third- as compared to first-person memories is higher than had
initially been postulated (Rice and Rubin, 2011), in that almost
50% of the individuals tested here resonated most strongly with
a third-person perspective. Given that both first- and third-self
perspectives regularly operate during unconstrained mind wan-
dering, this suggests that each can be functional in everyday life.
Future research will be needed to elucidate if the consequences of
mental simulations are influenced not only by the content of the
mental world, but also by how we naturally view it.
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